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Global Health Impact:
A Basis for Labeling and Licensing Campaigns? i

I. Introduction
Every year 9 million people are diagnosed with tuberculosis, every day more than 13,400 people
are infected with AIDS, and every 30 seconds malaria kills a child. ii About a third of all deaths, 18 million a
year or 50,000 every day, are poverty-related. iii Most of the world’s health problems afflict poor countries
and their poorest inhabitants.iv There are many reasons why so many people die of poverty-related causes. v
One reason is that the poor cannot access many of the existing drugs and technologies they need. Another is
that little of the research and development (R&D) done on new drugs and technologies benefits the poor.
There are several proposals on the table that might incentivize pharmaceutical companies to extend access
to essential drugs and technologies to the global poor. vi Still, the problem remains – the poor are suffering
and dying from lack of access to essential medicines. So, it is worth considering a new alternative. This
paper suggests rating pharmaceutical and biotechnology companies based on how some of their policies
impact poor people’s health. It argues that it might be possible to leverage a rating system to encourage
companies to extend access to essential drugs and technologies to the poor.
Consider a few possible uses for a rating system that this paper will explore more fully below. One
possibility is to give the highest rated companies, in given year, a “Global Health Impact” label to use on
their products. These companies would then have an incentive to use the label to garner a larger share of
the market as those engaged in trade and investment may prefer to purchase goods and invest in companies
that help the poor. Other labeling campaigns include Fair Trade, Organic, Ethos, RED, and the Sustainable
Forestry Initiative. Having a rating system for pharmaceutical and biotechnology companies would also
open the door to all kinds of fruitful social activism including global health licensing campaigns.
Pharmaceutical and biotechnology companies rely, to a large extent, on university research and
development. So, if universities give preference to highly-rated companies in licensing their technology,
companies will have an incentive to become highly rated. This idea is along the lines of the Universities
Allied for Access to Essential Medicines licensing campaign. A rating system, even with an associated
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labeling and licensing campaign, will not solve all of the poor’s health problems. Nevertheless, this
proposal has some advantages over and might be used in conjunction with existing proposals. Together
they may have a significant impact on access to essential drugs.
II. Creating a Good Rating System
One possible rating system is the recently released Access to Medicine Index publicized by the
New York Times, which rates companies based on their policies but does not (yet) provide the basis for a
labeling or licensing campaign. vii The Access to Medicine Index rates companies along several dimensions
including their R&D, patenting, pricing, and drug donation programs. It aims to improve access to
medicine.viii
Select Access to Medicine Index Ratings

Figure 3. Select Access to Medicines Index Ratingsix
Unfortunately, the Access to Medicine Index has some serious problems. Its ratings are primarily
subjective and may be unduly influenced by irrelevant information. The index solicits input from many
“stake-holders” (pharmaceutical companies, doctors, non-governmental organizations etc.) irrespective of
whether their interests compete with the interests of the poor. It is not clear what impact different interest
groups have on the final rating. Another problem is that the index gives companies credit just for having
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good policies in place (more than 50% of the original Index was policy-based). This is analogous to
rewarding someone based on how they say they are going to carry out a project. As anyone familiar with
Enron’s official code of ethics knows, good policies do not guarantee good outcomes.
A better rating system would be objective and output-based. x That is, it would reward companies
based on how their R&D results and charitable contributions etc. actually impact poor people’s health. It
would not just reward companies based on the amount of resources they put into creating and helping poor
people access essential drugs and technologies. Companies rewarded for their investments might make it
seem like they are investing more in helping the poor than they are. This is a real concern given that
biotechnology and pharmaceutical companies may already be exaggerating their R&D costs. xi Furthermore,
rewarding investments creates no incentive for companies to be efficient and productive. If what we really
care about is whether the poor can access essential drugs and technologies, it is probably better to reward
companies based on how much their policies actually increase access.
To create an objective, output-based rating system researchers should probably look at many
aspects of companies’ R&D and charitable endeavors. xii Researchers might consider, for instance, how
much each company’s charitable contributions are doing for the poor by looking at its a) drug donations, b)
price reductions, c) approved and verifiable health-projects (e.g. health-related infrastructure improvements
in developing countries), d) technology transfer programs for developing countries and e) efforts to
enhance developing countries’ research capacities.xiii The goal would be to measure the number of disability
adjusted life-years (DALYs), or whatnot, companies’ R&D and charitable efforts are averting in
developing countries.xiv
Consider here just one way of rating companies’ R&D output. xv It would take a very long time to
look at all the drugs each company produces, even in a given year. Fortunately, researchers might estimate
companies’ R&D output by looking at all the US Food and Drug Administration approved "orphan" drugs
and seeing how much each could alleviate the global burden of disease (GBD). Orphan drugs are those that
biotechnology and pharmaceutical companies expect (or say they expect) to have very small markets in the
US.xvi So the drugs and technologies for neglected diseases that researchers would want to incentivize
companies to produce should be listed as orphan (companies already have incentives to produce drugs and
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technologies for which there is a large US market). xvii Some orphan drugs will not help the poor and there is
an incentive for companies to get as many drugs as possible listed as orphan because they get up to a 50%
tax credit for testing orphan drugs.xviii Researchers might, however, do an effectiveness analysis on orphan
drugs that address neglected diseases to estimate how much each of these drugs will help the poor.
Although there are different ways of doing effectiveness analysis and the calculations can get
quite complex, the basic idea is simple. First, look at each drug’s market price and the amount of need
equivalent dosages of each will fulfill in developing countries (e.g. in DALYs). xix The amount of need
equivalent dosages of a drug will fulfill might be calculated using the DALY information in the WHO’s
Global Burden of Disease study and drug efficacy estimates from clinical trials or meta-analyses of such
data.xx Suppose of the 34 million DALYs lost to malaria in 2004, 80% can be attributed to plasmodium
falciparum (the worst kind of malaria).xxi Quinine is effective in about 9% of cases. xxii So, Quinine probably
averted about 2.5 million DALYs.
The next step is to rate companies on the basis of their inventions’ impact -- aggregating their
individual inventions’ impacts (in terms of DALYs averted). Suppose Pfizer has three drugs that avert the
loss of 1.1, 1.5 and 2.1 million DALYs, respectively. Suppose Bayer has two drugs that avert the loss of 2.2
and 2.4 million DALYs, respectively, Bayer may be ranked above Pfizer. Bayer’s drugs avert 4.7 million
DALYs, while Pfizer’s avert 4.6 million DALYs.
There may be good reasons to modify this kind of rating system. To insure that companies do not
get too much credit for producing slight variations on standard drugs and technologies, it might be good to
consider how much improvement each drug offers over the next best alternative. xxiii To do this it might
suffice to simply subtract the expected benefit to the poor of the best old drug or technology from the
expected benefit of the new drug or technology. xxiv Companies would, however, receive credit if their
products alleviate more disease because they have better pricing strategies, for instance, even if their drugs
offer no new therapeutic improvements.xxv
The details of this schema would have to be worked out carefully and might diverge significantly
from those suggested here. Economic analysis might help maximize the positive impact on the poor. It
might be more difficult to capture the impact biotechnology and pharmaceutical companies are having on
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the poor than to create standards for good working conditions as the Workers’ Rights Consortium has tried
to do. Still, there is a lot of work on effectiveness analysis in the literature. xxvi This work might also provide
the basis for evaluating companies’ charitable efforts.xxvii
If it is too difficult to find verifiable information on the impact of some of companies’ charitable
or R&D endeavors, that may not present an insurmountable obstacle for a rating system. It may be possible
to start with the available information, eliciting more information as a condition of rating companies once
the system is in place. xxviii Some information is sensitive, but if companies want to compete for ratings, they
have an incentive to release it. Furthermore, companies may benefit in other ways from providing some of
this information to the public. Perhaps this is why many companies are already collaborating with
researchers to document their charitable and drug donation programs.xxix
Another reason for optimism is that, the rating system need not be very precise. It just matters that
researchers establish a feasible bar over which companies must pass to receive GHI certification and that a
rating system yields the correct ordinal ranking of companies. So, even if a rating system is initially quite
imperfect, that may not be a problem.
It is important, however, that the index encourage companies to make sustainable changes in their
policies for the long term rather than just pursue policies that pay off in the short term. The idea is to
reward them for their impact on global health over time. So it is important that the rating system itself is in
place for a long time, and gives appropriate weight to rewarding long term investments that actually
improve poor peoples’ health.
A good rating system should probably be developed and administered by an appropriately
impartial and transparent rating organization. Perhaps a non-governmental group like Doctors Without
Borders or the World Health Organization would be willing to develop and oversee such a project. If the
organization does not have the relevant research capacity, it might partner with academics specializing in
health evaluation methodologies. Alternately, governments or international organizations might develop the
rating system and provide the requisite oversight (as the US government does with the USDA Organic label
and the International Standardization Organization does with the ISO 14000 environmental management
standards).xxx In either case, however, input from all the relevant stakeholders including biotechnology and
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pharmaceutical companies may be essential to create a good and sustainable rating system. This will help
insure that companies get credit for as many of the good things they are doing as possible and may expose
potential areas of abuse.
Finally, a good rating organization should probably have a review panel to address unforeseen
problems as they arise. This panel can hear objections to allowing a company to receive credit for a
proposed project and alter the rating system as necessary. xxxi It is impossible to foresee every problem. It
may also be counter-productive to spend time worrying about problems that may not arise.
III. Global Health Impact (GHI) Labeling
One way of encouraging biotechnology and pharmaceutical companies to extend access to
essential drugs and technologies to the poor with a rating system like that described above is to create a
Global Health Impact (GHI) label that they can use on their products. Then, these companies will have an
incentive to voluntarily use the label to garner a larger share of the market. If Wyeth, for example, was
highly rated, Wyeth could use the GHI label on Advil. Wyeth would have an incentive to do so because
consumers and doctors might, in some cases, prefer to purchase and prescribe GHI Advil over the
alternative analgesics. If even a small percentage of consumers or doctors would prefer GHI products, the
incentive to use this label for analgesics alone could be significant in this approximately two-billion dollar
a year market. xxxii (Note: The top ten analgesic pills seem to capture between 2-14% of the market each and
they are all available over the counter from Walgreens and other pharmacies). xxxiii This proposal might be
useful wherever there is a market for companies’ products.
It is worth exploring this option, given the success of other labeling campaigns. Fair Trade
campaigns have, for instance, been quite successful. In 2000, European countries sold 27 million pounds of
coffee worth more than 300 million dollars.xxxiv Fair Trade coffee sales amounted to about 1.2 percent of the
European market.xxxv About 50,000 retail outlets (97% of roasters) including Starbucks, Peets, and Green
Mountain coffee sell Fair Trade certified coffee, even Exxon Mobile sells the stuff. xxxvi And it is not just
coffee. By 2007, Fair Trade certified sales were approximately €2.3 billion. xxxvii RED and Buy Pink – for
companies willing to donate a portion of the sale of a product to AIDS and breast cancer research – have
also been quite successful. RED has provided 150 million dollars to the Global Fund and is one of its
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largest contributors, for instance. xxxviii USDA Organic label, LEED certification for green buildings, and
FCS and Smart Wood Certified Forestry sustainable forestry labeling are likewise growing. Ethical
consumption, supported by such campaigns, is generally on the rise. In the UK, for instance, expenditure on
ethical goods and services in energy, housing, household goods, transportation, personal items, and
subscriptions almost doubled between 2002-2007.xxxix
Furthermore, there is reason to think that a GHI label, in particular, could create large incentives
for positive change.xl One percent of the market in analgesics alone is 20 million dollars. xli Markets for
other pharmaceutical products are much larger. The US market for prescription allergy medicines in 2001
alone generated revenues of more than $6.45 billion (1.7 billion came from over the counter allergy and
asthma products before Claritin, Allegra, and Zyrtec were off prescription).xlii
Patients, doctors, and insurance companies will not always prefer GHI drugs and technologies.
Sometimes there will be one medicine that is best for a particular condition in which case its GHI status
may not matter. In many cases it would not even be a good idea for patients, doctors, or insurance
companies to choose GHI products if they are not the best choice for a particular disease or disability.
Many drugs have equally good competitors, however. In 2006, 63% of all prescriptions were for
generic drugs. When there is an equally good competitor for drugs under patents, patients, doctors, and
insurance companies might take the ratings into account. xliii Furthermore, many over-the-counter
medications have equally good competitors. The market for over the counter medicines in 2004, alone, was
US $16 billion.xliv This market includes many drugs made by major pharmaceutical companies including
Nicorette, Monistat, and Claritin that have reasonable competitors.
If generic companies were also rated (e.g. on the basis of their drug donation programs and
charitable contributions) the potential impact of GHI labeling would be even larger. The market for
generics is over 20 billion and consumers are often indifferent (or nearly indifferent) between generics and
other medicines. xlv So the fact that pharmacies usually do not carry more than one generic of the same
molecule should provide no objection to this proposal (people might prefer a GHI certified generic
medication to its patented competitors). If consumption of GHI goods reached 1% of the market in overthe-counter and generic medications -- - that would yield at least 3.6 billion dollars worth of incentive for
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biotechnology and pharmaceutical companies to become GHI certified. xlvi This number looks big enough to
incentivize even Pfizer to do some good.
Furthermore, pharmaceutical companies make all kinds of products besides drugs – from diet
drinks to lotion and pet vitamins to mouth wash. Pfizer, for instance, makes parasiticides, anti-infectives,
biologicals, allergy, cancer, pain, metabolic disease, production, nutritionals, and food safety products for
animals. Besides their pain management, dietary supplements, respiratory, topical, and GI medicines for
people, they have “a full line of infant formulas, follow-on formulas, growing-up milks, and prenatal and
adult supplements.”xlvii So, they could use the GHI label on these products too.
Finally, insurance companies might create additional incentives for companies to extend access to
essential drugs and technologies to the poor. Both (public and private) insurance companies could create
incentive for positive change by giving (some) preference to (otherwise equivalent) GHI drugs on their
formularies. They might even be encouraged to do so if a similar rating system were designed to measure
insurance companies’ impact.
Having different (e.g. gold and silver star) labels might also help ensure that the GHI rating
system does not just “rubber stamp” what may be genuinely bad behavior on the part of biotechnology and
pharmaceutical companies.xlviii (Initially, even the best companies might not be doing enough to extend
access to essential drugs and technologies to the poor.)
Even in the absence of a complete account of companies’ obligations or multiple labels, however,
a GHI rating agency can avoid condoning bad behavior in other ways. Just as it is possible to reward a
generally bad employee or child for doing something right, it is possible to reward a generally bad
company for good behavior. It is just essential that everyone utilizing the GHI label is clear about exactly
what it does and does not mean.
Although some companies may try to undercut the GHI label or game the system by, for instance,
lobbying the rating agency or creating counterfeit labels, there are also reasons for highly ranked
companies to support it. If the rating standards are transparent and simple, and consumers and health care
professionals are educated about the GHI label, it might be widely trusted and alternatives viewed with
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suspicion. This seems to be the case with Fair Trade labels, for instance. xlix Governments might even
regulate use of the label as the US did, however imperfectly, with “Organic” labels.l
IV. GHI Licensing
Having a GHI certification system for biotechnology and pharmaceutical companies would also
open the door to many other ways of incentivizing companies to extend access to essential drugs and
technologies to the poor. Activists who believe people have a human right to essential drugs and
technologies might, for instance, organize boycotts of non-essential medicines produced by companies that
are not GHI certified (just like animal rights advocates organized boycotts of tuna caught by companies that
did not use dolphin safe nets). Alternately, socially responsible investment companies could include in their
portfolio GHI companies.li Such activism might positively impact the poor’s access to essential drugs and
technologies.
GHI might even encourage new kinds of social activism. An organization along the lines of
Universities Allied for Access to Essential Medicines (UAEM), which promotes licensing practices to help
the poor, might create a campaign to get universities to develop “GHI licensing” policies. lii Alternately, the
American Medical Student’s Association, which uses metrics to put pressure on pharmaceutical companies
and universities to improve policies, might launch a GHI licensing campaign. Since UAEM has already had
some success with getting universities to accept their (very important) Equitable Access License (i.e. openaccess license), there is reason for optimism.liii
Pharmaceutical and biotechnology companies rely, to a large extent, on university research and
development. Universities have developed many drugs and technologies including vaccines, tests for
osteoporosis and breast cancer, and the “gene splicing technology that initiated the biotechnology
industry.”liv Many big pharmaceutical companies license in or acquire a large percentage of their drugs (by,
say, purchasing small biotech companies) from universities. lv “In 2002, for example, Pfizer licensed in 30
percent of its drugs, and Merck 35 percent.” lvi All of Bristol-Myers Squibbs’ best selling drugs in 2003
were licensed.lvii Pharmaceutical companies probably acquire even more of their most innovative drugs
from universities.lviii “Nearly all HIV/AIDS and cancer drugs are based on outside research -- most of which
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is university research sponsored by the NIH.” lix In 2000, a US Senate report found that federal funding
supported the development of 15 of the 21 most important drugs. lx
On a conservative estimate, about a third of all R&D is done by universities in high income
countries. The percentage may be even greater as companies have a large incentive to over report R&D and
include marketing costs as R&D.lxi

Figure 4: R&D in High Income Countrieslxii
This was not so a few years ago. In 1980, congress passed the Bayh-Dole act which allowed
universities to patent their research and to license it to third parties. lxiii Before the act was passed,
universities received less than 250 patents a year. In 1996, universities received over 2,000 patents,
“executed nearly 2,200 licensing agreements, and received royalty income from licensing of $242
million.”lxiv Between 1980-2007, over 1,500 start-up companies were formed from academic research. lxv In
2005, there were at least 28,349 active licenses.lxvi
Furthermore, there is reason to believe pharmaceutical companies are coming to rely more and
more on universities. Recently in-house pharmaceutical research has not been very productive. lxvii In light
of its dry pipeline, the pharmaceutical industry is “searching ever more desperately for drugs to license
from small biotechnology companies and universities.”lxviii
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Because biotechnology and pharmaceutical companies depend to a great extent on university’s
licenses, universities could, conceivably, influence these companies’ policies. lxix If, for instance,
universities’ licensing agreements required preferential treatment of companies that were highly rated,
companies would have an incentive to meet GHI standards. lxx Universities might adopt a GHI licensing
policy voluntarily. Their technology transfer offices could agree to implement GHI licensing practices. At
the University of Pittsburgh, for instance, the head of the Office of Technology Management has this
decision making capability. Though, he would probably also require the support of the chancellor if the
policy negatively impacted the university’s ability to sell licenses.lxxi Depending on how the GHI standards
are set, the policy might not negatively impact the sale of university licenses. At least it is worth carrying
out the requisite econometric analysis to determine the likely impact on all of the relevant stake-holders
(including universities and the poor).
Technology transfer offices already use some non-financial criteria when deciding to whom to
license their products. The Bayh-Dole act encourages universities to license to small, US companies.
Universities acquiesce without complaint.
If the technology transfer offices at some universities are reluctant to sign on to voluntary
programs, however, professors and researchers might have an impact because they sign agreements to
allow universities to license patents resulting from research they create. Although some researchers at
major universities receive industry funding, only 7% of university research is funded by industry. lxxii
Pharmaceutical funding probably makes up only a portion of the total.lxxiii
Universities might be receptive to the idea since:
…universities hold an avowed commitment to creating and disseminating knowledge for
the public good, and they have pledged to see the technologies they develop deployed to
benefit the world. Campus decision makers are insulated from lobbies that may dominate
political arenas; they are expected to be responsive to students and faculty; and they
operate in an environment where reasoned debate, not power, is expected to be the
currency. lxxiv
As the Association of University Technology Managers put it, universities are not only concerned about
monetary benefits but want the new drugs and technologies they develop to “be used to further the public
good.”lxxv
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Students could also encourage professors and universities to make the necessary revisions. They
might follow United Students against Sweat Shops’ (USAS’) example. USAS has helped convince
campuses to buy “sweat-free” clothing made at factories approved by the Worker Rights Consortium.
Alternately, students might emulate Universities Allied for Access to Essential Medicines (UAEM).
UAEM has convinced universities to adopt Equitable Access (i.e. open access) licensing policies. lxxvi If a
GHI licensing campaign was only as successful as USAS’s campaign has been so far, this proposal could
create 840 million dollars worth of incentive for pharmaceutical companies to become certified every
year.lxxvii That is about the cost of developing a new drug on the highest estimates. lxxviii This incentive might
suffice to double the number of drugs produced for neglected diseases between in 1975-1999 in a similar
time-frame.lxxix
V. Advantages of the GHI Proposals
GHI labeling and licensing have some advantages over and avoid some of the problems with the
main alternatives. One advantage is that it might both help the poor access existing drugs and technologies
and encourage new R&D for the poor. Most of the alternatives address only one of these problems.
Consider, first, just a few alternatives to help the poor access existing drugs and technologies. It is
impossible to canvass every proposal in the literature here. lxxx There are many innovative licensing and
intellectual property strategies not discussed below that merit serious consideration, for instance. lxxxi One
way of lowering the cost of existing drugs and technologies is via differential pricing. lxxxii Biotechnology
and pharmaceutical companies might offer drugs at different prices for different markets. lxxxiii Another
option is compulsory licensing. Countries can issue licenses to produce and/or import these products
without approval by the company holding the patent. Yet a third way of lowering the cost of existing drugs
and technologies is to repeal the World Trade Organization’s Trade Related Intellectual Property Rights
Agreement (TRIPS) or, barring that, modify it to allow poor people to secure essential medicines at or
below the marginal costs of production.lxxxiv
Although companies do some differential pricing, they have also resisted differential pricing. lxxxv
In some cases, companies may suffer financially if they lower their prices for the poor. It may be hard to
prevent re-importation of cheaper versions of identical-drugs across borders, even with different packaging.
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So, it is not likely that companies will pursue differential pricing to the extent required to protect global
health.
Similarly, companies often resist compulsory licensing. When South Africa passed its Medicines
Act, many of the big pharmaceutical companies sued because the act encouraged generic competition for
AIDS medicines.lxxxvi It was only after protracted negotiations, and a great deal of negative media attention,
that the pharmaceutical companies withdrew their lawsuit. South Africa did not go on to import generic
AIDS medicines.lxxxvii At the behest of companies, other countries have been singled out in the 301 Reports
of the US Trade Representative for not being aggressive enough in enforcing foreign intellectual property
rights and have, thus, faced the threat of trade sanctions. lxxxviii The US has also used bilateral trade
agreements and “diplomatic and political pressures to undermine countries that produce generic medicines
and/or consider importing them.”lxxxix
Worse countries without their own manufacturing capacity may not be able to secure the drugs
they need even if they do issue compulsory licenses. xc TRIPS requires countries like India, Brazil, and
Thailand that export essential drugs and technologies to issue compulsory licenses to do so. xci So far, only
one country (Canada) has agreed to export drugs under a compulsory license. xcii It issued a compulsory
license to export TRIPVAR, an AIDS medication, to Rwanda. xciii Though, given the complexity of
international and Canadian law, Canada was yet to export a single pill three years after issuing the
license.xciv
Finally, there was a large social movement, backed even by the (then) Pope, to prevent
implementation of the TRIPS agreement. xcv Ultimately, it failed. xcvi Biotechnology and pharmaceutical
companies want control over the drugs they develop in every market. So it is unlikely that there will be a
return to the pre-TRIPS situation or even that the agreement will be modified substantially to reduce prices
in poor countries.xcvii
Alternatives to GHI that encourage R&D on essential drugs and medications for neglected
diseases include prize funds and grants. xcviii Agencies or individuals often agree to buy a certain number of
doses from any company that develops a malaria vaccine at a set price. Foundations often give grants for
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research on neglected diseases.xcix The Gates’ Foundations recently partnered with Novartis to support
testing of new antibiotics for TB, for instance.c
Neither alternative takes full advantage of the efficiency the free market offers. The agencies
offering prize funds or grants have to decide what neglected diseases or problems they want to address and
there may be better ways to help the poor. They also have to decide how much a given intervention is
worth. “These decisions are likely to be associated with substantial inefficiencies due to incompetence,
corruption, lobbying by companies and patient groups, and gaming.” ci
Adian Hollis’ and Thomas Pogge’s alternative is to create a second (voluntary) patent system. cii
Under this system, biotechnology and pharmaceutical companies would not be given a limited monopoly
for their inventions. Rather, inventors would be rewarded based on how much their inventions contribute to
ameliorating the GBD. Inventors would have an incentive to invest in whatever R&D, infrastructure
improvements, pricing systems, or donation programs would make the most impact on the GBD. They
might even price their drugs below the marginal costs of production to capture a greater reward from this
alternative patent scheme. The scheme would give inventors an incentive to collaborate with, rather than
protest against, generic companies, country governments, and non-governmental organizations trying to
alleviate the GBD. If the design details are properly worked out, Hollis’ and Pogge’s patent system would
not create an incentive for companies to prefer drugs that treat the chronic diseases or disorders of affluent
patients. Rather, companies would have an incentive to invest in those drugs that prevent the most death
and alleviate the most suffering. In earlier work, Pogge said that the “cost of the plan might peak at around
$45-$90 billion. With all the world’s countries participating, $45 billion amounts to 0.1 percent and $90
billion to 0.2 percent of the global product.”ciii In the proposal developed with Hollis, they advance a
revised estimate of $6 billion.civ
Unfortunately, Hollis and Pogge’s proposal may also have a few problems. cv First, not all
reductions in the GBD are due to an inventor’s efforts. Although a new drug or investment in infrastructure
might help ameliorate a disease, things non-governmental organizations or other country governments are
doing, independent of the investor, may contribute more. It is not clear that Hollis and Pogge are concerned
to prevent investors from receiving undue credit and investors have incentive to claim credit where it is not
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due. Second, Hollis and Pogge’s current proposal relies on collecting a lot of new data by, for instance,
funding expensive clinical trials. They also want an accurate estimate of impact as they plan to reward
companies in proportion to their impact on the global disease burden. The necessary data is expensive and
hard to collect.cvi Finally, their proposal is quite expensive and depends on the goodwill of developed
country taxpayers or donors who have historically done little to help the global poor. cvii Unless it is well
funded, it will not generate a large enough incentive for companies to risk investing in new drugs and
technologies.
This paper’s proposal avoids some of the problems sketched above. First, many biotechnology and
pharmaceutical companies have an incentive to support the GHI proposals while almost (if not) all
companies lack the incentive to do enough differential pricing, and almost all have an incentive to resist
compulsory licensing and a return to the pre-TRIPS situation. Second, GHI takes full advantage of the freemarket’s efficiency. A GHI rating agency need not decide what diseases or problems companies should
address, nor need it determine how much inventions are worth before they are created. cviii Rather, a GHI
rating agency would reward companies based on how much their inventions and investments actually help
the poor. Third, the GHI rating system is output based and could be used to incentivize companies to not
only do R&D on neglected diseases but to extend access on existing drugs and technologies to the poor.
Fourth, it does not benefit companies that do not help the poor. It is supposed to capture only what
companies have already done. The way this paper proposes to evaluate companies’ R&D, for instance, is
by looking at what their drugs can do. It does not suggest collecting expensive new data or estimating the
GBD.cix Furthermore, it only aims to rank companies ordinally and provide a constantly raising bar for
companies to try to exceed. So it is much less data-intensive than Hollis and Pogge’s alternative. Fifth,
although the proposal is not as ambitious as Hollis’ and Pogge’s, it has the advantage of being practical and
relatively low cost. Although it will cost something to administer a trademark like GHI, those costs are
nowhere near US $45-90 billion (or even US $6 billion). cx The total revenue and support for Transfair
USA, the primary Fair Trade labeling organization in the US, was US $5,570,933 in 2006. cxi So, unlike
Hollis’ and Pogge’s proposal, this one would not require taxpayer support. It could even be developed in
poor countries.
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Finally, the case for GHI labeling and licensing campaigns does not depend on showing that they
are better than the alternatives or establishing a hierarchy between them. The GHI proposal sketched above
does not compete with any of the other proposals on the table. Rather, it can be used in conjunction with all
of the alternatives to bring even greater benefits to the poor.
VI. Objections
Even if this paper’s proposal has some advantages over some of the main competitors, it may not
be a good idea to pursue it. Perhaps there are better things biotechnology and pharmaceutical companies,
universities, researchers, students, and consumers could do. Poor people’s greatest health problems cannot
be solved by better access to existing drugs and technologies or more R&D on diseases affecting the poor.
War, natural disasters, dirty water, and inadequate food provide the biggest obstacles to health in
developing countries. Prevention and poverty alleviation could do much more for the poor than pills. Some
anti-retrovirals, for instance, do little for the poor in parts of the world where people lack adequate nutrition
without which the drugs are often ineffective.
It is impossible to decide whether there are better things agencies or individuals could do besides
supporting GHI in biotechnology and pharmaceutical companies a priori. New vaccines against typhoid,
cholera, and malaria or better access to antibiotics might do as much for the poor as vitamin A supplements
or a few more wells. GHI might lead companies to come up with new anti-retrovirals or treatment regimes
that work in the poorest places. Even if there are other things that could, in principle, benefit the poor more,
there may be room for those with different interests and talents to take different approaches to ameliorating
poverty. It is also possible to support GHI and provide food, vitamin supplements, and wells.
A more pressing objection is that, if a GHI rating system is put in place, highly rated companies
might try to distract the public from their generally poor behaviour in other arenas. Suppose, for instance,
that another organization launched a campaign to get companies to stop fighting compulsory-licensing in
developing countries by lobbying US trade-representatives. Companies might respond by holding a media
event to promote their GHI status and undermine the campaign. Since companies control a lot of resources,
they would probably win a battle in the press.

16

Companies hardly need a label, however, to hold a public relations event and undermine
campaigns to get them to improve their practices. Companies can promote their charitable programs, or
even start new programs to get good publicity. Those involved in the attempt to get pharmaceutical
companies to improve their practices should not blame each other if companies abuse their efforts. Rather,
they should stand together –the GHI review panel might even create standards for reducing companies’
high ratings if they find new ways of acting poorly. Although a rating system for pharmaceutical and
biotechnology companies will not solve all the poor’s health problems, they may make a significant
difference in many people’s lives.
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